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VIII. JUDICIAL REVIEW-ACTIONS REVIEWABLE
A. REVIEWABILITY: AN EXAMINATION OF FORMALITY, FINALITY
AND RIPENESS
A significant portion of recent developments in administrative law
relates to refinements of the standards governing judicial reviewability
of agency action. At the outset, this section will attempt to separate
and highlight the ambiguous and frequently overlapping component
factors considered by the courts in determining reviewabil-
ity-formality, finality, and ripeness. After the general inquiry into
the nature of the factors of reviewability, three of the most significant
cases in this area decided in 1971 will be examined in detail to illus-
trate approaches employed by the courts in reviewability cases. It is
the theme of this section that a broadly defined concept of ripeness
has been given a paramount position in recent decisions at the expense
of the other concepts with a resulting shift in concern from the effec-
tive operation of the administrative process to an inquiry more tradi-
tionally viewed as directed at the justiciable nature of the controversy.
There is no well-defined test used by the courts for determining the
judicial reviewability of an agency action. The decision to review such
action involves a process of balancing the integrity of government
agency operations against the need of private parties for judicial inter-
vention. Traditionally, an analysis of formality, finality, and ripeness
is conducted within the context of a widespread judicial desire to avoid
premature intrusions into the administrative process. A court's pre-
disposition toward avoidance of judicial-administrative clashes is
premised upon considerations of economy, recognition of agencies as
depositaries of expertise,' and recognition of the appropriate judicial
position in relation to administrative bodies.2 The countervailing force
preventing the development of an outright presumption of noninter-
1. For a pertinent example of judicial recognition of agencies' peculiar abilities, see Univer-
sal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951). In examining the appellate court's role
on an appeal from an NLRB order, Mr. Justice Frankfurter noted that the NLRB is "one of
those agencies presumably equipped or informed by experience to deal with a specialized field
of knowledge .. " This recognition is reflected also in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1970), which allows judicial review of final agency action except so far as
action is committed by law to administrative discretion.
2. Note, Judicial Acceleration of the Administrative Process: The Right to Relief fron
Unduly Protracted Proceedings, 72 YALE L.J. 574, 577 (1963).
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ference is the need for a method by which an aggrieved party can
secure protection through independent evaluation of the agency ac-
tion.3
Assuming that the threshold questions of case or controversy and
standing are met by the plaintiff,4 judicial attention traditionally turns
to the issues of the degree of formality, finality and the ripeness of
the administrative action. Formality pertains to the procedural pro-
cesses established to provide a method for systematic, orderly action
by the agency.5 The focus of the formality inquiry is upon whether the
agency action is the product of these prescribed procedures. Tradi-
tionally the courts have been reluctant to review informal agency
action6 in part because of the high value placed upon informal meth-
ods. The flexibility of these informal techniques has been presumed
to result in greater administrative efficiency and effectiveness.7 The
primary purpose of the formality criterion, however, relates to aver-
sion toward undue dissipation of judicial resources in examining in-
formal action.
Judicial attention also traditionally centers on the nature of the
agency's action to determine if certain criteria of finality were satis-
fied, inasmuch as "final agency action" is an express prerequisite of
3. See Jaffe, Administrative Law: Burden of Proof and Scope of Review, 59 HARV. L. REV.
914,920 (1966).
4. See National Automatic Laundry and Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 443 F.2d 689, 692
(D.C. Cir. 1971), wherein the court observes that the concepts of case or controversy, standing,
finality, formality, ripeness, and exhaustion of administrative remedies are all "intermeshed in
the overall determination of the appropriate occasion for judicial review." The factors of case
or controversy, standing and ripeness, however, relate more broadly to the inquiry as to the
justiciable nature of a dispute. Justiciability pertains to the character of the controversy between
the plaintiff and the agency; it focuses" upon the appropriateness of the conflict for judicial
resolution and seeks sufficient adverseness to assure an effective presentation of the issues.
Consequently, the characteristics of the agency's action are relevant in this determination to
the extent that the action is substantial enough to warrant an adverse reaction on the part of
the complainant. To this extent the different inquiries as to justiciability and reviewability
overlap.
5. A rationale for this requirement is suggested in Helco Products Co. v. McNutt, 137 F.2d
681, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1943), in which the court observed: "To permit suits for declaratory
judgments upon mere informal, advisory, administrative opinions might well discourage the
practice of giving such opinions, with a net loss of far greater proportions to the average citizen
than any possible gain which could accrue."
6. See, e.g., Nor-Am Agricultural Products, Inc. v. Hardin, 435 F.2d 1151, 1157-59 (7th
Cir. 1970), petition for cert. dismissed, 402 U.S. 935 (1971); Third Ave. Ry. v. SEC, 85 F.2d
914 (2d Cir. 1936).
7. Helco Products Co. v. McNutt, 137 F.2d 681, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
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the APA. 8 Final action denotes a want of additional steps or proce-
dures necessary before enforcement or implementation can be under-
taken.9 A recent case which illustrates the traditional application of
the finality criteria is Lever Brothers Co. v. FTC.'0 That case involved
an FTC notice of proposed rulemaking in regard to information
printed on the containers of phosphate detergents. A manufacturer
filed an action to enjoin the Commission from conducting further
proceedings on the ground that the FTC lacked statutory authority
to promulgate its proposed rule by means of the procedures which the
Commission allegedly intended to follow. Holding the action unrev-
iewable, the court noted that only a proposed rule was in question;"
consequently, the FTC action lacked finality within the meaning of
the APA.Y2
The third traditional factor pertaining to reviewability is ripeness,
a concept close to finality. Ripeness is a judicial construct involving
consideration of the legal controversy between the litigants rather
than the administrative action to be reviewed." The principle relates
to the timing of the litigation and is concerned with whether, at the
time the judicial process is invoked, the controversy is sufficiently
substantial so as to avoid depletion of judicial resources by examining
hypothetical disputes.1 4 In 1967 the Supreme Court in Abbott Labo-
8. "Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is
no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review." 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1970).
9. Cf. National Automatic Laundry and Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 443 F.2d 689, 698
(D.C. Cir. 1971), discussed at pp. 287-91 infra.
10. 325 F. Supp. 371 (S.D. Me. 1971).
1I. Id. at 373. For a similar holding, see Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970).
12. 325 F. Supp. at 373. "[lit can hardly be contended that the pending rule-making
proceeding constitutes 'final agency action' within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure
Act. The rule-making process is far from complete." Id. The court employed the approach
established in Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149-52 (1967), wherein the Supreme Court
examined finality, as required by the APA, as a component of a bifurcated test of ripeness
requiring an examination of both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship
on the parties if court consideration is withheld.
13. JAFFE 395. But see Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967), wherein the Court
considered satisfaction of the APA requirement of finality of agency action as part of determin-
ing whether the issues presented were ripe for judicial resolution. Accord, Lever Bros. Co. v.
FTC, 325 F. Supp. 371 (1971).
14. Since both finality and ripeness relate to concern for preventing an unwarranted dissipa-
tion of judicial resources, the two concepts seem particularly difficult to distinguish. Indeed,
Professor Jaffe implies that ripeness may perhaps be meaningfully discussed only as a group
of related doctrines, rather than a definable, independent principle. JAFFE 395. Nevertheless, the
concepts are distinct. Ripeness is strictly a judicial construct designed to eliminate premature
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ratories v. Gardner15 propounded a bifurcated view of ripeness.
Whether an issue is ripe demands, first, an evaluation of the fitness
of issues for judicial resolution and, second, a determination of the
hardship to the plaintiff of withholding judicial review. 6 Satisfaction
of both parts of the test results in the successful fulfillment of the
ripeness requirement. The Abbott approach was applied in General
Motors Corp. v. Volpe," where an automobile manufacturer insti-
tuted an action to set aside an order by the Secretary of Transporta-
tion requiring it to notify owners of certain vehicles of defects relating
to vehicle safety. The court determined that the defect notification
order constituted final agency action within the meaning of section
704 of the APA, 8 but nevertheless concluded that the section was not
reviewable because neither facet of the Abbott test for ripeness was
completely satisfied. First, the questions presented involved compli-
cated factual as well as legal issues, so that the action was not suitable
for judicial resolution. However, little significance was attached to
this aspect since the issues were otherwise fit for judicial determina-
tion and the effect of the order was sufficiently direct to render the
issues appropriate for judicial review. 9 More importantly, the court
determined that there was no substantial hardship to the manufac-
turer in withholding judicial consideration since the company could
present its grievances at an enforcement action being brought by the
agency.20
Also illustrative of the determinative quality of the second prong
of the Abbott test 2' is National Helium Corp. v. Morton,2 2 in which
judicial action, while finality pertains as well to the integrity of agency processes and demands
consideration of the administrative-judicial separation of power. See Comment, Administrative
Law: Agency Press Release Allegedly Misinterpreting Statute Held Sufficiently Finalfor Decla-
ratory and Injunctive Relief, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 135, 136 n.10 (1963).
15. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
16. Id. at 149.
17. 321 F. Supp. 1112, 1125-30 (D. Del. 1970).
18. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1970).
19. 321 F. Supp. at 1125-30.
20. Id. at 1125.
21. Although not expressly invoking Abbott, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals in Tatum v. Laird, 444 F.2d 947,954-55 (D.C. Cir.), cert granted, 404 U.S. 955 (1971),
examined the alleged hardship placed upon plaintiffs, namely the present inhibiting effect of the
military's gathering and distributing information regarding civilian political activities, in deter-
mining that the controversy was ripe.
22. 326 F. Supp. 151 (D. Kan.), affd, - F.2d , - (10th Cir. 1971). The court
held that companies which had been awarded contracts for the extraction and sale of helium to
the government were entitled to judicial review of the termination of the contracts.
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the court held that once it is established that a legal wrong is being
suffered as a result of agency action, the availability ofjudicial review
is presumed.2 Similarly, in Air Line Pilots' Association International
v. Department of Transportation,24 a pilots' association sought review
of an FAA determination that the construction of three multi-story
buildings would not constitute a hazard to air navigation. Although
the agency determination had no enforceable effect, hardship suffi-
cient to meet the second prong of the Abbott test was located in the
fact that the determination removed a potential barrier to approval
of the construction, as a result of which opponents to the proposed
buildings suffered what the court considered to be a "significant set-
back. ' 2 Although the court's analysis would arguably result in al-
lowing review regardless of the agency's determination,2 it is under-
standable that considerations of hardship were of decisive importance
in determining the result.
Although in theory the concept of "reviewability" can be sepa-
rated into its critical component parts-formality, finality, and ripe-
ness-and analyzed as above, it must be noted that any analysis
confined to a rigorous, step-by-step examination of each of the factors
will frequently ignore the realities of the judicial decision-making
process. Cases decided in 1971 illustrate that courts will frequently
ignore certain of these factors and concentrate upon the practical
concern of the position of the complaining party, a consideration
which theoretically is merely one component of the Abbott ripeness
test. This new approach calls into question the vitality of the various
components of reviewability as independent considerations.
The Limitation of "Formality" as a Requisite for Judicial Review
A recent decision by the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit indicates that the traditional conception of formal-
23. Id. at 154.
24. 446 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1971).
25. Id. at 241.
26. Under the Fifth Circuit's approach, the second prong of Abbott would have been
satisfied by the proponents of the construction project had the FAA determined the proposed
buildings to be hazardous. Therefore, no matter what course the agency took, by the court's
analysis the FAA determination would have been reviewable. This result is further suggested
by the court's deference to the Abbott caveat that "judicial review of a final agency action . .
will not be cut off unless there is persuasive reason to believe that such was the purpose of
Congress." Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140, cited with approval in Air Line Pilots',
446 F.2d at 241.
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ity may be significantly limited as an independent criterion of review-
ability. Independent Broker-Dealers' Trade Association v. SEC 7 held
that suggestions made by the Securities and Exchange Commission
to the New York Stock Exchange, which led to a vote by the Ex-
change to abolish customer-directed give-ups of brokerage fees,
presented an action sufficiently final to entitle the Independent
Broker-Dealers' Trade Association, a third party which questioned
the legality of the action, to limited judicial review. In an extended
series of communications between the SEC and the Exchange, the
SEC expressed its displeasure with both the Exchange's commission
rate schedule and the practice of customer-directed give-ups, but
the Exchange exhibited reluctance to change either policy.29 Ulti-
mately, the SEC accepted counter-proposals offered by the Ex-
change whereby customer-directed give-ups would be abolished.
The Exchange proposals were adopted by its members, whereupon
the Independent Broker-Dealers' Trade Association petitioned
the District Court for the District of Columbia for review of the
SEC action which led to the revision of the Exchange's policy. The
district court dismissed the complaint, holding that since the SEC's
action was merely a suggestion, the matter was foreclosed from
27. 442 F.2d 132 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 828 (1971).
28. "Give-up" is the term used to describe the practice whereby a securities broker pays
another broker-dealer a part of the minimum commission which, under the rigid minimum
commission rate structure of the Exchange, he is required to charge his customer. The Exchange
did not permit volume discounts on commissions based on numbers of shares sold in a transac-
tion, and in order to circumvent the rate structure, brokers were willing to "give-up" large
percentages of their commissions in order to execute high-volume orders. The Exchange upheld
its rate structure and at the same time permitted the directly conflicting give-up practice.
29. 442 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1971). On July 18, 1966, the SEC wrote to all national securities
exchanges expressing its concern over give-ups. In its December, 1966 report to the House
Commerce Committee, the SEC reiterated this concern and recommended again that the ex-
changes abolish the practice. In the first major response from the president of the Exchange on
January 2, 1968, Robert Haack stated in a letter to Exchange members that he supported the
incorporation of a volume discount in the rate schedule but supported the continuation of give-
ups. Shortly thereafter, on January 26, 1968, the SEC announced its intention to adopt a rule
whereby give-ups would be prohibited unless the benefits of the practice accrued to the invest-
ment companies and shareholders. On May 28, 1968, the SEC issued an order directing a public
hearing and investigation on several matters, including give-ups. At the same time, the SEC
chairman wrote to President Haack making a written request pursuant to section 19(b) of the
Securities and Exchange Act that the Exchange amend its rate structure either by following a
fee schedule prepared by the SEC or by eliminating minimum rates entirely on substantial
orders. The Exchange's president responded on August 8, 1968, and accepted the first proposal
suggesting the abolition of give-ups. The SEC promptly accepted these counter-proposals in its
letter of August 30, 1968.
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judicial review. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit vacated the lower court's judgment dismissing the action,
but found for the SEC on-the merits.30
The informality of the SEC's action in Independent Broker-
Dealers is troublesome for purposes of analyzing reviewability. Tradi-
tionally, courts have been reluctant to review any type of informal
agency decision or interlocutory order and have hesitated in terming
agency action "final" where it lacked formality,31 even though its
effects upon regulated parties might be final. However, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has recently held argua-
bly informal action to be reviewable. In Medical Committee for
Human Rights v. SEC3 the SEC declined to compel Dow Chemical
Company to include in its proxy statements various proposals by the
Medical Committee, a Dow stockholder, concerning manufacture
and sale of napalm. The court rejected the SEC's contention that
since it took no affirmative action, its inaction could in no way consti-
tute a reviewable order and held that the SEC's no action decision
was reviewable.
In discussing what constituted reviewable action, the court in
Independent Broker-Dealers emphasized that the issue could not be
resolved by reference to "captions or labels. ' 33 Thus the court dec-
lined to base reviewability on the frequent use of the word "direction"
in the letter in which the SEC had accepted the Exchange's proposals
to abolish give-ups. Consistent with this approach the court refused
to characterize the SEC's action as a nonreviewable suggestion
merely because it was based on a request rather than a formal order
issued pursuant to exchange regulation procedure.34 The events were
viewed "broadly" to determine the extent of the SEC's involvement
in the process culminating in the Exchange's decision to abolish give-
ups.35 The Commission's course of conduct was sufficiently definite
and purposive to remove any impression that its actions were "devoid
of legal materiality. ' 3 Adopting the "pragmatic" approach to evalu-
30. 442 F.2d at 135.
31. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
32. 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated as moot,40 U.S.L.W. 4117 (U.S. Jan. I1, 1972),
noted in 1971 Duke Project 281-94.
33. 442 F.2d at 139.
34. 15 U.S.C. § 78s (1970).
35. 442 F.2d at 137.
36. Id.
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ating and categorizing agency action promulgated in CBS v. United
States3 7 the court noted that over an extended period of time the SEC
had pressed the Exchange to amend its rate structure and to prohibit
give-ups. The Exchange's compliance with the SEC's approved policy
was hardly a voluntary submission to an agency request but was
instead an attempt to salvage the rate schedule and assuage the SEC.
In this mode of analysis of agency action, the court clearly has
created an exception to the formality requirement. If, in examining
the process culminating in a change in behavior of the regulated party,
a purposive and substantial agency involvement having a direct causal
relationship to the modification is discerned, such involvement is sig-
nificant enough to warrant judicial review regardless of the form in
which the involvement is couched. Accordingly, the court noted that
"order" or "request" may be terms of conclusion rather than analy-
sis. 38 By avoiding reliance upon such semantic touchstones, courts are
forced to examine the most pertinent question, namely whether there
has been a significant exercise of agency power causing such a change
of behavior that the plaintiff suffers a judicially cognizable injury.
The exception created in Independent Broker-Dealers for the for-
mality requirement, however, is very similar to the second prong of
the Abbott test for ripeness.39 Abbott requires that the plaintiff suffer
significant hardship while Independent Broker-Dealers requires that
there be some "substantial agency involvement" causing the plain-
tiff's injury. The result is to shift the focus of judicial attention from
"formality" to the "ripeness" determination and thereby signifi-
cantly limit "formality" as an independent restraint upon judicial
review.
The Demise of "Finality" as a Requisite for Judicial Review
Just as Independent Broker-Dealers limited the formality criterion
by emphasizing ripeness considerations, another recent case,
Aquavella v. Richardson," similarly deemphasized the "finality"
requirement by finding ostensibly temporary action to be sufficiently
"final" to warrant judicial review. In that case the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit held that the temporary suspension by the
37. 316 U.S. 407 (1942).
38. 442 F.2d at 140.
39. See notes 15-26 supra and accompanying text.
40. 437 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1971).
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Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare of Medicare payments
to a private hospital pending the outcome of a formal investigation
constituted final agency action under section 10(c) of the APA4' and
therefore was reviewable by the district court. The plaintiffs, doctors
who operated a private 60-bed hospital, were directly reimbursed by
the federal government for services rendered to patients eligible for
assistance under the Medicare Act. 42 After several years of opera-
tion,4 3an HEW review of cost reports submitted by Glen Oaks Hospi-
tal revealed that unusually large amounts for ancillary services had
been reported and received. 41 When an on-site review allegedly uncov-
ered irregularities, the Secretary in July, 1969, suspended payments
until an audit could be completed to determine the existence and
amount of any overpayments. The plaintiffs immediately filed a com-
plaint to enjoin the Secretary from withholding payments, claiming
the suspension was imposed without statutory authority and without
the required guarantees of procedural due process. Soon thereafter
Glen Oaks closed, allegedly because of its inability to operate without
federal assistance. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack
of jurisdiction on the ground that the suspension was intermediate
action pending final determination and therefore was not a final ac-
tion reviewable under the APA. The court of appeals reversed and
remanded the case for a decision on the merits.4"
The Medicare Act4" expressly provides procedures for judicial re-
view of two types of administrative determinations, neither of which
would include the temporary action involved in the instant case. Sec-
tion 1395cc(b)(2) provides for the termination of an agreement with
a provider of services, subsequent to the Secretary's giving notice
specified in the regulations, if the Secretary determines that the provi-
der of services is not complying substantially with the provisions of
the agreement or statutory provisions, or if the provider has failed to
cooperate with the Secretary in an agency investigation of its opera-
tions. Section 1395ff(c) in turn provides that an institution or agency
41. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1970). See note 8 supra for the text of the statute.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1970).
43. The hospital had become a nursing home almost exclusively for Medicare patients and
depended upon Medicare benefits for virtually all of its revenues.
44. 437 F.2d at 400.
45. Id. at 399.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1970). See generally H. SOMERS & A. SOiERS, MEDICARE AND THE
HOSPITALS (1967).
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dissatisfied with any determination that it is not a "provider of serv-
ices" is entitled to a hearing and to judicial review of the Secretary's
final decision subsequent to such hearing. It further provides that any
institution or agency dissatisfied with any determination under section
1395cc(b)(2) shall likewise be entitled-to a hearing and judicial review.
On its face, the Medicare Act appears to preclude any other means
of judicial review since it incorporates section 405(h) of the Social
Security Act which provides:
The findings and decisions of the Secretary after a hearing shall be binding
upon all individuals who were parties to such hearing. No findings of fact or
decision of the Secretary shall be reviewed by any person, tribunal, or govern-
mental agency except as herein provided. 47
The Secretary argued that this section precludes review in this case
since it states that no decision of the Secretary is reviewable except
as provided in the Medicare Act and that Act does not provide for
review of suspension of payments.48 Insofar as Congress selected the
types of determinations to be reviewed, review of other determinations
must be precluded. Relying upon Cappadora v. Celebrezze,49 however,
the court rejected this argument. In that case the preliminary question
was whether there was jurisdiction to review a decision of the Secre-
tary not to reopen disallowance of a claim for benefits under the
Social Security Act. In response to the contention that section 405(h)
precluded review, the court observed that the provision merely forbids
attempts to review certain types of agency decisions by any method
other than that provided in section 405(g)50 and did not preclude
judicial review of other types of decisions under the APA. Despite the
fact that in Aquavella the Secretary's decision was made under the
Medicare Act, "the interpretation of section 405(h) in Cappadora
applies here as well."15 ' In short, so long as the Medicare Act does not
47. 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) is incorporated into the Medicare Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ii (1970).
48. Suspension of payments, the action taken in Aquavella, is distinguishable from termina-
tion of an agreement with a provider of services on the basis of the permanent nature of the
latter action, as compared with the presumably temporary nature of the former.
49. 356 F.2d I (2d Cir. 1966).
50. Section 405(g) provides in pertinent part:
Any individual, after any final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing to which
he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of such
decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice
of such decision or within such further time as the Secretary may allow. Such action shall
be brought in the district court of the United States. . . .42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1970).
51. 437 F.2d at 402.
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establish procedures for review of suspension of payments. section
405(h) does not preclude review.
Upon the court's determination that the Medicare Act did not
preclude review, the question of reviewability under the APA became
controlling. The district court had dismissed the amended complaint
on the ground that the suspension of payments did not constitute
"final agency action" under the APA. According to the Aquavella
court, the "elusive" concept of finality, as well as the "related and
overlapping" doctrines of ripeness and exhaustion of administrative
remedies, had been typically employed by tribunals in determining
reviewability. 2 Recognizing that each doctrine has its own "nu-
ances," the court indicated that an element common to each is the
need for a "careful balancing of the need for effective judicial protec-
tion against the need for efficient and responsible administrative ac-
tion."53
In its analysis, the court relied heavily upon the Abbott rationale,
which viewed the question of final agency action as relevant to the first
of its two-pronged test for ripeness-whether the issues presented were
appropriate to judicial determination.54 Although this Abbott inter-
pretation of ripeness subsumed the finality issue, Abbott still required
that an independent examination be made to determine whether the
APA requirement of final agency action was satisfied. The Abbott
Court stressed the final or "definitive" nature of the regulation there
in issue which had been "promulgated in a formal manner after
announcement in the Federal Register. . .. -5" In short, viewed from
the perspective of the agency itself rather than the complainant, the
regulation at issue in Abbott appeared final. Aquavella altered the
Abbott rationale considerably by conflating "finality" and the sec-
ond prong of the Abbott ripeness test. The court merely examined the
impact on the private party, thus failing to make an independent
examination of finality from the agency standpoint. Aquavella's di-
vergence from the Abbott approach is indicated by the court's obser-
vation that both aspects of the ripeness test are "relevant to the final
agency action question." 56 The result of the Aquavella rationale is to
52. Id. at 403.
53. Id.
54. See notes 15-26 supra and accompanying text.
55. 387 U.S. at 151.
56. 437 F.2d at 403.
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make any agency action which is involved in a ripe controversy
necessarily final.
A ripe controversy, however, does not necessarily entail existence
of final agency action, if finality is considered in relation to the
agency's internal processes. 57 Cases such as Aquavella consider the
finality issue from a different perspective than intra-agency function-
ing. The question then becomes whether the effect of the agency action
upon the regulated party is merely tentative and uncertain, or whether
the party is actually affected adversely by the action.-8 If this ap-
proach reflects the developing judicial inquiry into final action, clearly
the doctrine of finality merges with the second prong of the ripeness
test propounded by Abbott. What is not clear is whether the congres-
sional meaning of final action in section 10 of the APA harmonizes
with the judicial definition, nor is it immediately apparent what im-
pact the transition in the judicial focus will have on the administrative
process.
A further illustration of the demise of the "finality" criterion as
ai independent factor in determining the reviewability of agency ac-
tion is provided in National Automatic Laundry and Cleaning Coun-
cil v. Shultz, 9 in which the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit created a presumption of finality. In Automatic
Laundry the court held that a letter by the Administrator of the Wage
and Hour Division of the Department of Labor stating that in his
opinion coin-operated laundries are subject to the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act"0 constituted a final agency ruling amenable to judicial
57. Although, as the court observes, id. at 404, no statutory procedures existed in Aquavella
whereby the aggrieved party could secure administrative review of the suspension, this fact alone
does not warrant an assumption of finality. Suspension was employed as a temporary device
prior to an administrative determination of misapplication of Medicare funds. Examining the
events strictly in terms of whether the agency's procedures had run their course, the suspension
would appear to be nonfinal action much in the same manner as the basic decision to examine
Glen Oaks' operations.
58. "Under the 'pragmatic' approach developed in the case law, such harm alone is often
sufficient reason to find final agency action." 437 F.2d at 404. See also Abbott Lab. v. Gardner,
387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967); Trans-Pacific Freight Conference of Japan v. Federal Maritime
Board, 302 F.2d 875 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
59. 443 F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
60. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1970). The Fair Labor Standards Act was enacted in 1938 to
meet the economic and social problems of that era. Despite the ameliorative effects of the
legislation, however, the FLSA's coverage became steadily less comprehensive as the economy
grew. In 1966 the Senate Subcommittee on Labor found a "significant correlation" between
poverty earnings and exclusion from the provisions of the FLSA. For example 41 percent of
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review prior to its enforcement. The National Automatic Laundry
and Cleaning Council (NALCC) had sent a letter of inquiry to the
Administrator asking whether recent amendments to the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA)6' had any effect on the exempt status of em-
ployees of coin-operated laundries. The Administrator replied that the
amendments extended the operation of the FLSA to include the pre-
viously exempt employees.62 The district court dismissed NALCC's
following suit for declaratory judgment on the ground that the admin-
istrative action was not final because no enforcement proceeding had
begun. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the lower court had
jurisdiction to review the action but finding for the agency on the
merits.63
all children living in poverty were in families where there was a worker occupying a full-time
job throughout the year. In light of the situation, President Johnson in his message to Congress
on May 18, 1965, recommended that appropriate steps be taken to extend coverage of the
FLSA. Accordingly, the amendments subsequently passed, Pub. L. 89-601 (1966), were designed
to extend the benefits of the FLSA to an estimated 7.2 million workers and to raise the minimum
wage. See generally S. REP. No. 1487, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
61. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(3) (1970).
,62. Prior to the passage of the amendments, two pertinent exemptions from the FLSA's
coverage were provided in sections 213(a)(2) and 213(a)(3). Section 213(a)(2) provided for the
conventional retail or service establishment exemption, while 213(a)(3) specifically exempted
"any employee employed by any establishment engaged in laundering, cleaning or repairing
clothing or fabrics ... " The court in the instant case observed that in 1963 the Administrator
had ruled that coin-operated laundries were engaged in renting the service of laundry facilities
rather than engaged in laundering or cleaning and therefore were not exempt under 213(a)(3).
443 F.2d at 692. However, such laundries could still qualify for the 213(a)(2) retail or service
establishment exemption provided the enterprises satisfied that section's criteria. The amend-
ments of 1966, effective February I, 1967, repealed the specific laundry exemption of 213 (a)(3)
and added provisions specifying that establishments "engaged in laundering, cleaning or repair-
ing clothing or fabrics" could no longer qualify for the general retail exemption set forth in
213(a)(2). 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(2) (1970). Despite this development, NALCC presumed that its
members were unaffected by the amendments since the Administrator had ruled in 1963 that
such businesses were engaged in renting of machines, not in laundering or cleaning of clothing,
The letter of inquiry sought the Administrator's confirmation of the NALCC viewpoint. Rely-
ing upon his interpretation of the legislative history of the amendments, however, the Adminis-
trator responded that a coin-operated laundry is engaged in laundering or cleaning clothing
within the meaning of the Act and therefore is not exempted from coverage. The Administra-
tor's response precipitated the institution of the action.
63. 443 F.2d at 691. A study of the legislative history tends to substantiate the Administra-
tor's interpretation. Congress viewed the amendments as extending "coverage to 505,000 em-
ployees in laundering and cleaning establishments." S. REP. No. 1487, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 12
(1966). An understanding of broadened coverage is suggested by committee reports: "This
section repeals the minimum wage and overtime exemption applicable to employees in laundry
and cleaning establishments." Id. at 28. The amendments provide ". . . for complete mini-
mum wage and overtime protection for employees of such establishments." Id. (emphasis
added).
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Because the FLSA makes no provision for review of actions by
the Administrator, NALCC relied upon the APA to obtain review of
the Administrator's interpretation. 4 Interestingly, the court largely
ignored the need for an interpretation of the APA in light of the
factual situation involved and examined instead the factors of review-
ability discussed above.15 In the course of explicating the ripeness
principle as formulated in Abbott and the companion case of Toilet
Goods Ass'n, Inc. v. Gardner,66 the court accepted the Abbott view
that the APA "embodies the basic presumption of judicial review to
one 'suffering legal wrong because of agency action . ..within the
meaning of a relevant statute' . . . so long as no statute precludes
such relief or the action is not one committed by law to agency
discretion .. .*"I In light of the presumption of reviewability, the
remaining task was to examine whether the ripeness test was satisfied
and whether other factors of reviewability, such as finality and for-
mality, viewed in a "pragmatic," non-doctrinaire manner were pres-
ent.
It should be noted that under this approach the APA assumes
minor importance in affecting the result; the determinative issue is
whether the judicially created principles of reviewability are met in a
particular case. The importance of this development cannot be over-
emphasized since the congressionally prescribed method for permit-
ting review under the APA is subtly overshadowed by the judicial
inquiry as to the justiciable nature of a controversy. Clearly the
Abbott approach emphasizes the judicial proclivity for vindicating a
party's claim of right. This function inevitably collides with the con-
gressional desire to preserve the efficient operation of administrative
64. 443 F.2d at 696. NALCC's reliance upon the APA is not expressly articulated by the
court, but the opinion's extefided discussion of the APA, as interpreted by the Supreme Court
in Abbott, implies such reliance.
65. Recent decisions to an increasing extent turn to an analysis of the judicial developments
of the component factors of reviewability rather than to the relevant provisions of the APA. 5
U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1970). See, e.g., Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1968). In
Abbott the Court construed the APA to embody a presumption of judicial review rebuttable
only by statutory preclusion of review or statutory commitment to agency discretion. It seems
therefore that by this construction the APA presents no independent obstacle to review and in
most cases the court need only look to the judicial construction of finality, formality, and
ripeness. Accord, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971),
wherein the Court examined only section 701 and ignored section 704, which delineates those
actions which are reviewable, including "final agency action."
66. 387 U.S. 158 (1967).
67. 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967).
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agencies, while providing avenues for judicial relief when agency ac-
tion has reached a final stage.
Following the two-pronged rationale for ripeness in Abbott, the
court in Automatic Laundry first found the substantive issue in-
volved, namely whether the amendments were properly construed by
the Administrator, to be aptly suited for judicial determination. The
second aspect of ripeness, the hardship on the parties in deferring
consideration, was found in the prospect of adverse financial conse-
quences if NALCC's members complied with the Administrator's
view and in the consequences of possible litigation for failure to com-
ply. Further, the status of the "ruling" was strengthened by reference
to the doctrine promulgated in Udall v. Tallman"8 that the authorita-
tive interpretation of an executive official has the legal consequence
of commanding deference from a court if the interpretation is reason-
able and consistent with legislative intent. The Tallman principle dic-
tated that the Administrator's action "cannot be treated as a null,
adding nothing to the Act."69
The court then dealt with "finality" and held that an interpreta-
tion or ruling by an agency head will be presumed to be final.10 The
reasoning underlying this novel presumption of finality logically flows
from the pragmatic approach to reviewability, being based upon the
anticipated effect of such action. If the order or ruling on its face does
not appear to be tentative, it would likely be accepted as authoritative
by persons to be affected and consequently should be given the kind
of judicial deference contemplated by Tallman.
The presumption theory may have no functional effect upon the
administrative process, since to avoid reviewability an agency argua-
bly need only include a proviso in the communication indicating that
the conclusions or opinions contained therein are tentative.7 The
court's reliance upon Tallman to substantiate attributing finality to
such opinion letters is ill-founded. Tallman did demand judicial defer-
68. 380 U.S. 1 (1965).
69. 443 F.2d at 697.
70. Id. at 701.
71. The court indicates that the presumption could be defeated if the agency adopted a rule
prescribing its procedure in a manner that would identify certain actions as tentative. 443 F.2d
at 701.
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ence to the statutory interpretation of officers charged with the stat-
ute's administration; however, that case involved an interpretation by
the Secretary of the Interior which resulted in the development at
great expense of a large number of oil and gas leases.72 Absent circum-
stances of severe hardship caused by reliance upon the administrative
interpretation, the degree of deference in Tallman to the interpretation
may have been considerably less; therefore, reliance upon Tallman to
justify imputing finality to the agency interpretation in Automatic
Laundry might be misplaced. The Automatic Laundry decision is
further weakened by its dismissal of certain precedents on the grounds
that each involved merely an "advisory ruling." In spite of the court's
characterization of the actions involved in these decisions, the actions
were substantially similar to the one in Automatic Laundry.13
The test for determining finality is greatly simplified by
Automatic Laundry's innovative "presumptiveness" theory that, un-
less otherwise indicated on its face, an action by an agency head is
presumed final. The obvious danger in such a relaxation of the finality
standards, however, is the possibility of premature or unnecessary
disruptions of the administrative process. It is possible that congres-
sionally enacted programs designed to promote social or economic
goals could be thwarted merely upon a showing of the possibility of
injury, pecuniary or otherwise. The court purported to recognize this
danger and offered the procedural device of a class action to offset
the danger. This device, however, does not satisfy all of the screening
criteria provided by the "finality" requirement because it is designed
only to prevent undue proliferation of suits and does not prevent
premature interruption of agency processes.
Conclusion
The decisions in Independent Broker-Dealers, Aquavella and
72. 380 U.S. 1, 18 (1965).
73. Connecticut Importing Co. v. Perkins, 35 F. Supp. 414 (D. Conn. 1940); Denver Union
Stockyard Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 48 F. Supp. 308 (D. Colo. 1942). The
degree of formality and finality in Connecticut Importing was even greater than in the instant
case, yet review was denied. In that case an "Interpretative Bulletin" containing legal opinions
by the Administrator concerning the coverage of specified enterprises by certain statutes was
considered inadequate agency action to warrant a sufficiently adverse response on the plaintiff's
part to constitute an actual controversy. 35 F. Supp. at 416.
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NALCC aptly illustrate the continuing trend toward relaxation of
reviewability standards. The explanation of the development lies pri-
marily, as suggested above, in the courts' attributing greater import-
ance to the plaintiffs condition than to the independence of adminis-
trative processes. This policy choice is typically implemented by
greater emphasis upon the judicial concept of ripeness, with its focus
upon the aggrieved party's condition, at the expense of the concept
of formality and finality as used in the APA. The danger lurking in
these developments is that dogmatic reliance upon ripeness as the
determinative touchstone of reviewability may result in undue disrup-
tions of the administrative process.
B. PARTIAL REPEAL OF THE DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINIS-
TRATIVE REMEDIES
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, described
by the Supreme Court as a "long settled rule,"' occupies a prominent
position in administrative law.2 Yet, in United States v. Consolidated
Mines & Smelting Co. , the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
by recognizing a heretofore ignored sentence of section 10(c) of the
Administrative Procedure Act, 4 has caused a significant diminution
in the scope of the doctrine's application. In four separate decisions'
the Bureau of Land Management, an agency within the Department
of Interior, had decided that several mining claims held by Consoli-
dated Mines & Smelting Co. (CMS) were null and void. After CMS
ceased to pursue its claims before the administrative tribunals, the
agency filed this action to quiet title to the land in question. The
district court originally granted the ag6n-cy summary judgment on the
1. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50 (1938).
2. See generally 3 DAVIS § 20; JAFFE 424-58.
3. F.2d-. (9th Cir. 1971).
4. Except as otherwise expressly required by statute, agency action otherwise final is
final for the purposes of this section whether or not there has been presented or deter-
mined an application for a declaratory order, for any form of reconsideration, or, unless
the agency otherwise requires by rule and provides that the action meanwhile is inopera-
tive, for an appeal to superior agency authority. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1970).
5. ___F.2d at - Six agency decisions were at issue in this case. Because CMS had
exhausted the available administrative remedies in the first two decisions, the court simply made
a determination on the merits, sustaining the agency's position. See id. at - Only the
remaining four decisions are discussed in this note.
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